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Abstract 
 
Economic flexibility is much discussed in the academic literature but has no 
agreed definition.  In neoclassical economics, a flexible economy can be secured 
only by removing structural rigidities that block relative price movements and 
hamper the operation of markets ± social structures are seen as a threat to 
flexibility.  The current chapter criticises this neoclassical view and proposes a 
structural approach that acknowledges the importance of social structures for 
adjustments in all economic arrangements, including markets.  If structures take 
varied forms that may enhance as well as restrict human agency, then they are 
readily compatible with flexibility.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The idea of flexibility has become commonplace in economic discussion.  Price flexibility has 
always been a focus of attention, but flexibility is now interpreted more widely and applied to 
areas such as employment and production.  Interest in the topic has been aroused by the 
supposed global trend towards flexible economies. 
 
    Yet economic flexibility, despite its prominence in the academic literature, lacks a single 
definition and is construed in different ways by different authors.  Neoclassical economists 
often view flexibility as the absence of social structures impeding free markets: flexibility is 
then a prerequisite for Pareto efficiency, and inflexible structures or institutions should, if 
possible, be removed.  In the neoclassical ideal, a perfectly competitive economy would 
function as a complete, smoothly operating natural system where immediate price adjustments 
accommodate any changes in external circumstances. 
 
    From a non-neoclassical angle, this approach to flexibility is inadequate, since markets are 
unavoidably structural, based on role playing, and can never be structure-free.  Flexibility 
does not require that economies somehow escape social structures and deliver an efficient 
natural order.  The portrayal of economic flexibility should allow for the social structures and 
institutions that in neoclassical parlance would be described as imperfections or rigidities.  
Paradoxically, economic flexibility will revolve around what the neoclassicists regard as 
inflexibility. 
 
    Recent work in sociology is relevant here, as it provides more fluid versions of social 
structure.  One strand of this work is the interdependence of social structure and human 
agency, so that structure may enable as well as constrain action.  Another strand is the 
recognition of various types of social structure, for instance, institutional structures founded 
on roles and figurational structures founded on personal relations.  The interplay between 
structure and agency and among different types of social structure creates a broader analytical 
framework that can envisage many sources of flexibility. 
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    This chapter adopts an interdisciplinary approach and draws from recent sociological 
theories.  It argues that, contrary to the neoclassical view, flexibility is a structural property 
best understood through an augmented treatment of social structure. 
 
 
 
 
THE MEANING OF FLEXIBILITY 
 
The term 'flexibility' is more subtle than it appears at first sight and has several connotations 
passed over in much economic discussion.  Before considering economic flexibility, it is 
worth looking at what 'flexibility' means. 
 
    To describe an object or institution as flexible suggests that it can bend or adapt to external 
pressures without breaking or losing its shape.  Flexibility refers not just to a capacity to 
change, but to a capacity to change within a larger system or structure which itself remains 
unchanged.  The outcome mixes adaptation and stability: some limited adaptation does occur, 
but the containing system or object stays intact.  An example of this is the notion of the 
'flexible firm', where various modes of adaptation are available but they are all confined 
within a given, unchanging firm (Atkinson and Meager, 1986; Pollert, 1988b).  Aligning 
flexibility too closely with economic change may well be misleading.  Although flexibility 
seems to imply dynamism and fluidity, it may entail the persistence of economic 
arrangements in the face of external challenges.  Flexibility could be vital in reproducing and 
maintaining economic institutions. 
 
    A related point is that flexibility generally refers to short-term adaptations, as against long-
term changes of economic institutions or technology.  If economic changes went beyond 
minor adaptations and transformed the whole economic system, then they would no longer be 
classified under the heading of flexibility.  Rather, they would be part of a more radical 
process of economic evolution or growth.  Flexible institutions might seem conducive to 
economic progress, but this is not inevitably the case; short-term adaptations within a flexible 
system might stifle or delay fundamental reforms.  Consequently, short-term flexibility should 
be distinguished from long-term evolution and growth. 
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    Economic flexibility is anything but unidimensional, there being many dimensions in 
which adaptations take place.  Flexible employment, for instance, can be subdivided among 
numerical flexibility (changing number of workers), functional flexibility (redeployment of 
workers to different tasks), financial flexibility (changes in wages and other payments), 
working-time flexibility (changes in working hours), and labour-market flexibility 
(movements between different industrial and regional labour markets) (Rubery, 1989; Boje, 
1991; Dex and McCulloch, 1997, Chapter 1).  Production flexibility too appears in numerous 
guises and is not uniquely determined by technology (Morroni, 1991).  Systemic adjustments 
can be made through any of the key economic variables in the formal economy, such as 
prices, employment and output.  Because the formal economic accounts will record these 
variables, the adjustments will be visible and measurable.  Other sources of flexibility are less 
obvious.  Adjustments can be made informally, through changes in work intensity, variable 
working patterns, networking, and so forth.  Flexibility may be achieved by changes in 
several formal variables, alongside informal changes located beyond the formal economy or 
in the gaps left by formal arrangements.  Some adjustments will be interrelated, and it would 
be short-sighted to consider only one dimension of flexibility in isolation from the others. 
 
    Sceptics of economic flexibility feel that the many types of adaptation have little in 
common and do not cohere into a recognisable trend towards increasing flexibility (Pollert, 
1988a, 1991; Sayer, 1989; Clarke, 1992).  From this viewpoint, the apparent shift from 
inflexible Fordism to flexible post-Fordism has no real substance, and it would be better to 
discard blanket concepts such as economic flexibility.  If the term 'flexibility' is used 
carefully, however, it need not imply universal trends or common patterns and is compatible 
with diverse forms of economic adjustment.  Doubts over the post-Fordist and neoclassical 
analyses of recent economic experience can coexist with concepts of economic flexibility, as 
long as one accepts that flexibility exists in multiple, perhaps unrelated varieties and does not 
have to follow any single path.  It may, indeed, be wise to retain the idea of flexibility and aim 
for a more elaborate, heterodox interpretation, rather than abandon it to the restrictive 
neoclassical usage. 
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    The characteristics of economic flexibility - its systemic nature, its short-run time scale, and 
its diversity - all contribute to its being a complex and amorphous topic.  Such topics are hard 
to deal with theoretically, and any attempt to do so will be prone to oversimplification.  
Flexibility is, nevertheless, an important issue that should be addressed in economic theory.  
The following discussion first considers neoclassical accounts of flexibility and then moves 
on to alternative views. 
 
 
 
 
NEOCLASSICAL ACCOUNTS OF FLEXIBILITY 
 
Neoclassical economists have portrayed flexibility as the means by which an economy attains 
equilibrium outcomes with desirable efficiency properties.  Flexibility, in neoclassical eyes, is 
characterised by the result of a rapid and optimal adjustment process.  By contrast, 
non-neoclassical views of flexibility dwell on the means by which an imperfectly adjusted 
system can survive unforeseen external circumstances through partial adaptations with no 
efficiency properties and no continuously achieved equilibrium. 
 
    A major trait of neoclassical approaches is the dominance of price and wage flexibility over 
other modes of adjustment.  If economic arrangements are to be flexible, from the 
neoclassical standpoint, they must permit prices and wages to move freely and equate supply 
and demand, thereby generating allocative efficiency.  Other economic variables, such as 
output and employment, may also be changing, but they change in response to relative price 
movements and play no independent part in economic flexibility.  The dominance of price and 
wage movements means that neoclassical flexibility is less diverse than one might anticipate 
from surface observation of economic variables.  Other variables do change in neoclassical 
models, but they are subordinate to the prices and wages that guide economic behaviour.  In 
neoclassical theory, economic flexibility is virtually synonymous with price and wage 
flexibility. 
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    Neoclassical views of flexibility leave no room for slackness as a way of accommodating 
outside pressures and sustaining the economic system.  On the contrary, they dismiss 
slackness as an allocative inefficiency caused by imperfections or rigidities.  The faith in price 
adjustments assumes that the economy can function on a tight, allocatively efficient basis and 
that slackness and excess capacity must be harmful.  When slackness does appear, 
neoclassical theorists interpret it only as a symptom of inflexibility, not as a source of 
flexibility permitting short-run adjustment.  Their neglect of economic slackness prevents 
them from differentiating easily between the short run and the long run: all adjustments are 
accomplished through price variation, so flexibility cannot be set apart from longer term 
processes of economic growth and structural change. 
 
    As is standard with neoclassical methods, the account of flexibility says nothing about roles 
or social structure.  Economic agents have fixed preferences, whose origin goes unexplained, 
and act rationally in accordance with these preferences at all times.  There are no roles defined 
in relation to other people (forming a social structure) and distinct from people's actual 
behaviour.  The simplified, mechanical picture of human behaviour removes the flexibility 
made possible, for example, by the space left within formal roles.  Neoclassical theory 
tolerates only a single kind of economic flexibility: the one arising from the natural, asocial 
properties of perfectly equilibrating markets.  This universal, individualistic, socially 
unspecific account denies that flexibility is an attribute of particular social and economic 
systems.  Neoclassical flexibility comes from removing social imperfections and shifting to a 
universal market system on the lines of general equilibrium theory; a flexible economy should 
have little or no institutional baggage. 
 
    Flexibility in neoclassical theory normally refers to relations between individual agents.  
Far less attention is paid to flexibility within firms or other organisations, since neoclassical 
approaches generally treat firms as 'black boxes' responding consistently to external stimuli 
and adhering to profit maximisation.  With all firms having fixed, well-defined preferences, 
there is little need to delve into how firms are constituted and how they function; they are 
assumed to have found the best internal arrangements, otherwise they would not be reaching a 
true optimum.  Any adjustments are made through revised, optimal decisions in response to 
changed external circumstances. 
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    The way to encourage economic flexibility, for neoclassical economists, is to bring the 
economy closer to the neoclassical template by removing institutional or informational 
obstacles that might hamper free markets.  Under these conditions it is unclear why 
institutions such as firms exist, and the case for firms may require a breach of the ideal 
assumptions (Coase, 1937).  If actual conditions ever matched the theoretical ideal, then firms 
would either be superfluous or have to reflect market principles, with the members of the firm 
transacting among themselves (as in internal market reforms).  Neoclassical conceptions of 
flexibility, when applied to policy issues, will justify pro-market measures, stressing 
decentralisation, privatisation and curbs on trade union power.  Advances in information 
technology might seem to chime with neoclassical flexibility, as transaction costs fall and 
improved communications offer smoother functioning of markets.  Yet none of these 
developments can ever go as far as to make a real economy coincide with the stylised and 
artificial neoclassical benchmark. 
 
    Orthodox policy discussions of economic flexibility have had an implicit neoclassical core, 
revealed in the high profile given to wage flexibility and the assumption that increased 
flexibility must be desirable (OECD, 1986, 1987, 1994; IMF, 1994).  Although orthodox 
studies have recognised other sources of flexibility, they have given a special status to wage 
flexibility and promoted it as the badge of a truly flexible economy.  Any restrictions on wage 
movements have been characterised as rigidities that block the efficient functioning of 
markets and generate allocative inefficiencies, reduced investment and slower growth.  Such 
reasoning is evident in the contrast frequently drawn between the dynamic, 
low-unemployment US economy and the more regulated, high-unemployment economies of 
the EU: the differences are routinely attributed to the greater flexibility of US labour markets, 
even though the importance of wage flexibility remains doubtful and the reasons for the 
US-EU contrast may lie elsewhere (Palley, 1998; Simonazzi and Villa, 1999).  Implicit 
neoclassicism also underpins the assumption that flexibility is always beneficial, which allows 
policy analysts to recommend increased flexibility in all times and places.  This stems from 
the use of perfect competition as the benchmark in studies that ostensibly take an 
institutionally specific form.  The policy advice is governed by the theoretical presuppositions 
of the advisor, independently of the particular case being considered. 
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    Neoclassical flexibility clashes with the characteristics of flexibility identified above: it 
neglects diversity and gives precedence to wage and price flexibility over other sources of 
variation; it does not treat flexibility as a short-run phenomenon and merges it with more 
fundamental, long-run change; and it refuses to see flexibility as contingent on particular 
social structures.  The upshot is a narrow, distorted account of economic flexibility that 
obscures important issues; the rest of this chapter considers how structural approaches can 
give a fuller and richer account. 
 
 
 
 
STRUCTURAL APPROACHES TO FLEXIBILITY 
 
There is no official definition of social structure in sociology or elsewhere, but the commonest 
use of the term is based on a necessary or internal relationship among roles, where one role 
cannot exist without the other: cases from economics would be the roles of buyer and seller, 
creditor and debtor, and landlord and tenant.  This usage derives largely from Talcott Parsons 
and has come to be regarded as the mainstream sociological view (Parsons, 1951).  The role-
centred approach ensures that social structure, made up of interrelated roles, is distinct from 
the people who occupy roles and would persist even if the entire cast of role occupants was 
changed. 
 
    The customary image of social structure is as something hard and solid, like a building, 
which would seem to conflict with flexibility.  Structural approaches, taken to an extreme, 
could deny human agency and uphold the primacy of social context in guiding human 
behaviour.  Where 'hard' social structures prevail, the result might be a hierarchical, static, 
rule-based society with little leeway for change and few outlets for human agency.  Structural 
arguments have mostly appeared in sociology and are often contrasted with the agency-led 
individualism of neoclassical economics.  It is easy to depict structural methods as being too 
rigid to represent flexible markets, for which the individualism of neoclassical theory might 
seem better suited.  This is misguided, as all markets and other economic relations (flexible or 
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not) are structural and need a structural analysis.  Markets do not arise naturally or 
spontaneously, as neoclassical theory implies, but are maintained and organised through 
formal institutions to yield a standardised, impersonal setting for economic exchange 
(Hodgson, 1988, Chapter 8; Fourie, 1991; Lazonick, 1991, Chapter 2).  Since all markets have 
institutional content, one cannot legitimately equate economic flexibility with an absence of 
'rigid' structures.  Flexibility must occur within a broader social structure and can never stand 
alone. 
 
    Recent social theory has avoided a stark opposition of structure and agency and moved 
towards a closer interdependence, whereby social structure need not be at odds with human 
agency - prime examples are Giddens's structuration theory and Bhaskar's transformational 
model of social activity (Giddens, 1984; Bhaskar, 1979).  Other authors have made similar 
arguments expressed in different conceptual language (Bourdieu, 1977; Goffman, 1983; 
Alexander, 1985, 1998; Munch and Smelser, 1987; Elias, 1991).  The drift of social theory in 
the last few decades has been away from an unbending social structure that dominates human 
behaviour.  Instead, structures are seen as enabling as well as constraining human action, with 
agents in part influenced by structure and structures reproduced through human agency 
(Jackson, 1999).  Because social structure and human agency cannot be separated, it is no 
longer valid to regard social structure as an external, removable constraint on human 
behaviour.  Structures are vital to all human activities, flexible as well as inflexible. 
 
    Another strand in the sociological literature has softened social structure in a different 
fashion, by recognising a new, more fluid type of social structure, termed a figuration or 
figurational structure (Elias, 1978, 1991).  In a figurational method, social structure and 
human agency are replaced by figurations, which consist of relations among people, not roles 
or positions.  For any given society, figurations will be highly diverse, ranging from direct 
personal contacts to indirect dealings with representatives of government or business.  
Nobody can be isolated from figurations, and so individual agency becomes a redundant 
concept - all human action occurs in a social setting.  Likewise, there is no longer any need 
for a concept of role playing, and the usual agency-structure distinctions can be depicted 
through the distance and degree of formality in personal relations.  Face-to-face personal 
contact will permit more informal relations ('human agency'), while indirect contacts will 
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have to be formal and institutional ('role playing').  A figurational method hopes to transcend 
agency-structure dualism by replacing role-based social structures with people-based 
figurations that embody structure and agency. 
 
    Critics of figurational sociology have argued that figurations, on their own, cannot resolve 
the problems of agency-structure dualism and that the neglect of roles may blur important 
theoretical distinctions (Layder, 1994, Chapter 7; Mouzelis, 1995, Chapter 4).  To opt 
exclusively for figurational methods could oversimplify matters and provoke a collapse into 
structural or individualistic reductionism, depending on how personal relations are interpreted 
- a stress on indirect relations would downgrade human agency and free will; a stress on direct 
relations would imply a loose, unstructured aggregation of individual agents.  Figurational 
methods, the critics claim, will undermine a genuinely structural approach. 
 
    Instead of replacing social structure, figurations could be viewed as augmenting the role-
centred account of structure.  One can, for example, distinguish institutional structures (based 
on roles) from figurational structures (based on personal relations) and allow for both in social 
theory (Mouzelis, 1995).  Any social structure will have an institutional and figurational side, 
as it relies on role playing and on social interaction among the people involved.  No social 
role can cover every facet of the role occupant's behaviour, and even the most role-based 
human activities will have a residual, figurational component.  Recognising figurations will 
make social structure more pliable, diverse and responsive to external changes, so that it can 
no longer be just a barrier to human action. 
 
    The new approaches to social structure have significant implications for flexibility because 
they counteract the belief that social structures are fixed and an obstacle to change.  With 
looser and plural social structures it becomes straightforward to accommodate a degree of 
flexibility.  One possible approach is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1:  Institutional and figurational flexibility 
 
 
 
 
 
           Institutional structures               Institutional 
                                             flexibility 
                   
 
 
 
 
           Figurational structures                Figurational  
                                              flexibility 
                   
 
 
 
 
              Human agents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Diversity of social structure creates three interdependent layers (institutions, figurations and 
agents), none of which can exist without the others.  Flexibility can arise in Figure 1 in two 
ways, either through institutions or through figurations.  The first case - institutional 
flexibility - assumes that existing roles in production, employment and public policy can cope 
with external changes.  Examples are where rises and falls in demand can be met with 
variations in formal employment or where employment contracts sanction variable working 
practices.  The second case - figurational flexibility - meets external changes through personal 
relations extending beyond economic roles and contracts.  Even if institutions cannot in 
themselves cope with external changes, flexibility can still be attained through adjustments in 
figurational structures, particularly in the day-to-day working relationships among people well 
known to each other.  Any such adjustments are likely to be specific to a single workplace and 
probably temporary - if they persist and become permanent, they may be converted into new 
roles.  Generally speaking, more predictable changes will be met by institutional flexibility 
and less predictable changes by figurational flexibility. 
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    A structural account of flexibility raises the issue of who gains and who loses.  Neoclassical 
economics avoids this issue, as flexibility occurs through spontaneous price changes and the 
distribution of gains and losses depends on resource entitlements, assumed fixed from the 
outset.  Distributive matters can then be hived off from flexibility and considered under a 
separate heading.  With a structural account, flexibility does not emerge from an invisible 
hand process and can be obtained in various ways, which have their own distributive 
consequences.  Some adjustments would place the cost primarily on workers, whereas others 
would penalise employers.  A more socially specific approach can bring out the equity 
implications of flexibility often neglected in orthodox discussion. 
 
 
 
 
MICRO- AND MACRO-FLEXIBILITY 
 
Economic flexibility pertains to both the micro level of small-scale activities and the macro 
level of the whole economy.  For a firm or other economic organisation, flexibility is crucial, 
since the inability to meet unforeseen events could threaten the organisation's survival.  For a 
whole economy, flexibility aids the stability of the economic system - short-term variations, 
which might be perceived as instability, will protect the system from more severe upheavals.  
Both micro and macro flexibility can take an institutional or figurational form. 
 
    At the micro level, a firm or other organisation must respond to changes in economic 
conditions.  One option is to rely on institutional flexibility, expressible through impersonal 
roles, positions and contractual relations.  In labour markets a firm can respond to a change in 
the demand for its output by recruiting or laying off workers or by adjusting the working 
hours of current employees.  Recruitment/lay offs will have a far more unequal impact on the 
employees, causing hardship for those who lose their employment roles, but both approaches 
are institutional in form.  Other economic events might call for employees to be redeployed to 
different tasks and thus switched between employment roles.  Beyond labour markets, the 
adaptations made inside an organisation will frequently be channelled through institutional 
structures.  The idea of flexible specialisation links increased adaptability to a shift towards 
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greater decentralisation and vertically disintegrated production (Piore and Sabel, 1984).  
Small, loosely connected production units would, it is claimed, be better placed to revise their 
own practices and their relations with other production units in the face of fragmentary and 
rapidly changing patterns of demand.  Flexibility is here being fostered by new, more supple 
institutional structures. 
 
    Another option is for a firm to exploit figurational flexibility, which goes beyond 
recognised economic roles and positions.  In labour markets, employers could change the 
intensity of work within existing labour contracts or encourage their work force to adopt new 
working methods compatible with current employment roles.  The figurational dimension of 
production has long been discussed by heterodox economists, who have argued that labour 
contracts are incomplete and leave loopholes for flexible working practices.  Firms do not 
have a single optimum production method in the neoclassical manner, but allow some slack 
that permits variable productivity (Hodgson, 1982).  Much the same will apply in other 
contractual relations outside labour markets.  The impossibility of pure contract, as a general 
principle, ensures that contractual and institutional relations will not cover every possible 
adaptation and that some flexibility will occur by non-contractual and non-institutional 
means. 
 
    At the macro level, changes in economic activity can also be accommodated in several 
ways.  Output and employment variations are backed by public welfare measures, notably 
unemployment benefits and social assistance, which alleviate the poverty associated with 
unemployment and act as automatic stabilisers maintaining aggregate demand and reducing 
economic instability.  Output and employment variation has become institutionalised as the 
main avenue for economic adjustment in modern capitalist economies.  Within the present 
framework, the government can be seen as performing the economic role of supporting the 
unemployed.  The receipt of welfare benefits offers a role or social position for jobless people 
- they have lost their employment roles but are granted secondary roles as benefit recipients, 
so as to prevent their exclusion from institutional structures.  Welfare policies, often portrayed 
as rigidities in neoclassical theory, will ease economic adjustment by offsetting the harsher 
consequences of unemployment and reducing the volatility of aggregate demand. 
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    Other institutional structures at the macro level are bound up with macroeconomic policies.  
An activist macroeconomic policy on Keynesian lines entails a willingness to bolster and 
stabilise aggregate demand through fiscal and monetary measures.  The government takes on 
a role as an economic manager and establishes the necessary institutional structures, which 
will usually have a formal, visible character.  An inactive, laissez-faire policy stance might 
seem to rule out an economic role for government, yet it results from a deliberate decision to 
withdraw from economic management and constitutes a (passive) role being consciously 
played by government.  Hence laissez faire is not an unstructured state but the outcome of 
institutional structures precluding an active government policy.  Both activist macroeconomic 
policy and laissez faire are the expression of institutional structures that guide and influence 
policy making. 
 
    Along with its institutional aspect, macroeconomic flexibility will also have a figurational 
aspect.  Most people have negligible macroeconomic influence, as their economic behaviour 
is on too small a scale relative to the whole economy; they are micro agents who belong to 
macroeconomic aggregates but play no significant part in macroeconomic affairs.  But a few 
people, by virtue of their privileged status in the social structure, do have enough influence for 
their decisions to make a difference at the macro level: these macro agents include 
government policy makers, senior business leaders and major participants in financial 
markets.  The figurational aspect of macroeconomic flexibility will derive from the personal 
interactions among macro agents.  Sometimes the interactions may be direct and visible, as 
when politicians discuss coordinated economic policies or negotiate with the heads of 
multinational businesses about the location and extent of their investment plans; at other times 
the interactions may be less direct, as when investors in financial markets seek to anticipate 
the behaviour of government policy makers.  Personal interactions among business leaders 
could generate explicit agreements or much looser networks or tacit understandings with little 
formal expression.  The resulting figurational structures will stand beside institutional ones 
and may in some cases evolve into an institutional form - close cooperation between 
businesses can, for instance, culminate in a merger that replaces figurational with institutional 
structures. 
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SOURCES AND LEVELS OF ECONOMIC FLEXIBILITY 
 
Institutional and figurational structures will normally coexist, but their relative importance 
will vary.  If institutions are deeply entrenched and people follow clearly defined roles, then 
social structure is apt to be dominated by institutions, even though social interaction will also 
have a figurational element and role players may forge relations with other role players and 
perform their roles in a personalised fashion.  If, on the other hand, institutions are ill defined 
and give only weak behavioural guidelines, then figurations will assume a greater relative 
importance, as people will have to develop their own styles of working and interacting with 
others. 
 
    The same can be said of institutional and figurational flexibility: they will coexist but in 
some cases one will outweigh the other.  There is little prior reason to suppose that 
institutional and figurational flexibility are always correlated, to yield a 'flexible' economy 
(with high levels of both) or an 'inflexible' one (with low levels of both).  A more general 
view would let them vary independently and open up the prospect of institutional/figurational 
mismatches, where flexibility may have an asymmetrical quality.  Economies might be more 
flexible in the figurational domain than in the institutional domain, or vice versa, which 
makes it harder to talk in simple, dualistic terms about flexible versus inflexible economies.  
Adding figurations to the analysis helps to demonstrate the diverse sources and levels of 
flexibility. 
 
    If institutional and figurational flexibility can each take high or low levels, then there are 
four possible combinations, as shown in Figure 2.  High levels of institutional and figurational 
flexibility (top left of Figure 2) implies an economy whose institutional and figurational 
structures display a strong capacity for adaptation.  Under these conditions, the economy can 
accommodate short-term events and disturbances via regular adjustments of both institutions 
and figurations.  In the long run the economic system as a whole ought to be durable, given 
that the regular adjustments should prevent systemic breakdowns and remove the need for 
wholesale changes of system.  Short-run adjustments are coupled with long-run durability. 
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    The opposite case is where institutional and figurational flexibility are at low levels 
(bottom right of Figure 2).  Here the economy possesses fixed institutions and personal 
relations, which might be well matched with each other but show little capacity for 
adaptation.  The low flexibility should yield limited economic change in the short run, but 
over a longer period the economy would be susceptible to systemic failures and crises that 
might bring a change of economic system.  Short-run inertia is coupled with long-run 
instability. 
 
    The top-right case in Figure 2 involves institutions that cannot readily meet external 
changes, beside figurations that are malleable and fluid.  Most variability will have to come 
from figurations and may create tensions between changing figurations and invariant 
institutions: people's actual behaviour and relationships may diverge from their roles and 
social positions.  There will be pressures for the invariant institutions to change as well, 
especially if the figurational adjustments prove to be more than merely temporary and persist 
over long periods.  An example is where new technologies encourage new ways of working, 
expressed as figurational changes, which may clash with older roles and institutions. 
 
    The bottom-left case in Figure 2 combines variable institutions with unchanging 
figurations, so that institutions become the chief source of variability.  With the previous case 
reversed, the pressure is now for personal relations to conform to new and unfamiliar roles 
and positions.  An example is where managers of a firm introduce administrative reforms, 
setting up new roles that require changes in people's behaviour and personal relations.  
Whenever institutions and figurations are mismatched, there will be frictions or resistance to 
change within the social and economic system.  Long-run change will take place only if the 
variable element dominates and the initial resistance is overcome. 
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Figure 2:  Sources and levels of economic flexibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                Institutional flexibility 
 
                                                                                          
                                                      High                      Low 
                                                            
                   
                                                           
                                                                  Short-run                  Figurational/Institutional 
                                                                adjustments                            tensions 
                               High                                   
                                                          Long-run durability                Pressures for  
                                                         of economic system              institutional change 
                                                           
      Figurational                                              
       flexibility                   
                                                           
                                                    Figurational/Institutional                   Short-run 
                                                                  tensions                                   inertia 
                              Low                                  
                                                            Pressures for                     Long-run vulnerability 
                                                        figurational change                 to systemic failures 
                                                            
            
 
                                                
 
 
 
 
    Figure 2 conveys no normative message.  In particular, it should not be taken for granted 
that the top-left, high flexibility case is better than the others.  Whether flexibility is desirable 
or not depends on the nature of the adjustments and how they are being implemented.  
Flexible institutional and figurational structures may impose the heaviest adjustment costs 
upon the poorest and weakest groups in society, while protecting the interests of more 
privileged groups; on its own, flexibility cannot guarantee ethically appealing outcomes.  
Conversely, the low flexibility case at the bottom right of Figure 2 could denote a static but 
egalitarian society which, because of its inertia, gives rise to few adjustment costs - by some 
ethical criteria, this might be thought superior to more flexible alternatives.  Normative 
assessments cannot therefore rely on the degree of flexibility alone, but need to ask how 
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flexibility is accomplished and in whose interest it operates.  Within the scheme of Figure 2, 
each case can still embrace a wide range of adjustment methods with various social and 
distributive consequences.  One should beware the oft-encountered but oversimplified 
conclusion that high flexibility is inherently desirable. 
 
    Institutional and figurational flexibility are related to the concepts of system integration and 
social integration often invoked in the Marxian and sociological literature (Lockwood, 1964; 
Mouzelis, 1997).  System integration refers to whether the parts of a social system hold 
together and function smoothly, where the parts are impersonal items such as institutions and 
roles.  Social integration refers to whether the members of a social group or society interact 
harmoniously and identify with collective goals and interests.  In the present framework, 
system integration is concerned with institutional structures, and social integration with 
figurational structures (Mouzelis, 1995).  A stable, well-ordered society will have high levels 
of system and social integration, although at times one or the other might be lost.  In capitalist 
economies, for example, mass unemployment apparently indicates system disintegration but 
does not as a rule prompt major social breakdowns or unrest, which suggests that social 
integration has remained intact.  Using the twin concepts of system and social integration 
shows that a full treatment of economic change should acknowledge the personal and 
impersonal sides of how an economy functions, along with the connections between them. 
 
    In the scheme of Figure 2, institutional flexibility broadly corresponds to system integration 
and figurational flexibility to social integration.  An economy with institutional flexibility can 
make adjustments within the economic system itself, so the system is well integrated.  Less 
flexible systems will have fewer outlets for short-term adjustments and will be more prone to 
systemic difficulties.  Likewise, an economy with figurational flexibility will have close, 
well-developed personal relationships that can accommodate social adjustments without 
undergoing a breakdown; this implies a high level of social integration.  Inflexible figurations 
will involve more distant and less harmonious relations among members of society, together 
with an increased chance of frictions and resistance to change.  Unlike neoclassical 
economists, who usually see inflexibility in a negative light, Marxian and other heterodox 
writers writers may be more willing to put a positive gloss on figurational inflexibility: it 
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might indicate class consciousness among workers resisting flexible arrangements biased in 
favour of employers and capital. 
 
    Economic flexibility, as defined here, will bring only limited changes that can be contained 
within a given economic system.  Larger changes, over longer periods, will normally require a 
mismatch between institutional and figurational structures (top right or bottom left of Figure 
2).  If either institutions or figurations change independently, so as to create a mismatch, then 
there will be pressures for more fundamental social changes.  Such arguments characterise the 
theories of long waves and technical change put forward by the Regulation School, neo-
Schumpeterians and the social structures of accumulation approach (Boyer, 1988; Perez, 
1983; Freeman and Perez, 1988; Tylecote, 1991; Gordon, 1980).  Adopting a materialist 
stance, these theories root fundamental economic changes in a transformation of technology 
prior to later adjustments of institutions and social structures.  Long-run changes will start 
with new methods of production and novel ways of working which clash with older 
institutions; as the new methods are diffused, they evoke increasing tensions and pressures for 
institutional change until eventually new institutions are created, more in tune with the new 
technologies and working procedures.  A wave of expansion will then ensue.  In Figure 2, the 
stimulus to long-term growth comes from the top-right case, where new ways of working 
appear first through figurational flexibility and institutional change lags behind.  If institutions 
do undergo fundamental reform, then the economy will tend back towards a period of high 
institutional and figurational flexibility (top left of Figure 2).  Long-run development will then 
go through phases of institutional inflexibility, until the resistance to change is broken down, 
institutions and figurations are rematched, and institutional flexibility is restored. 
 
    From this perspective, a changing economy cannot be lodged permanently in the 'ideal' top-
left case of Figure 2 and must see periods of institutional/figurational mismatch when one 
source of change outstrips the other.  It follows that flexibility should not be equated with 
growth, and inflexibility with stagnation.  Economic growth takes place by a dialectical and 
historical process calling forth systemic tensions (inflexibilities) and, at certain times, crises 
and reformulations.  Contrary to what one might think, a perfectly flexible world would 
experience only minor changes within a perennial, all-encompassing social and economic 
system. 
  
- 19 - 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Two features of economic flexibility have been emphasised in the present chapter.  The first is 
that flexibility is a structural property, specific to particular social structures, and not 
something that emerges spontaneously from an unstructured environment.  If social structures 
are interdependent with human agency and multiple in form, as recent social theory has 
argued, it becomes clear that they may assist rather than restrict economic flexibility.  Their 
original image of hardness and solidity has been replaced by a softer image more consistent 
with variable economic arrangements.  Far from being an obstacle to economic flexibility, 
social structures provide the means by which flexibility is accomplished. 
 
    The second feature is that flexibility arises from diverse and open economic relations, as 
against a perfect, complete economic system.  No economy can make instantaneous and 
optimal adjustments to every external event.  Actual economies accommodate outside 
disturbances by having diverse, plural arrangements that allow for varied responses.  The 
diversity ensures that there is no unique, even-handed adjustment method; the outcomes of 
flexibility will be socially specific, giving rise to conflicting interests and an unequal 
distribution of gains and losses.  One should not therefore assume that flexibility is always 
and everywhere desirable. 
 
    Both features are missing from neoclassical economics, whose mistrust of social structure 
and reliance on perfectly adjusted equilibria presents a false account of natural, unstructured 
and optimal flexibility.  Neoclassical thought has overlooked important matters surrounding 
flexibility, including its structural basis, its short-run character, and its uneven social 
consequences.  A good starting point for examining these matters would be to learn from 
recent sociology and seek a richer understanding of how social structures underlie economic 
behaviour. 
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